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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Sam H. Bennion's (" Bennion" ) Petition is occasioned by an
Order of the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board") and,
therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(c)(IV) and Utah
Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16, the Utah Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction of the matter.

III.
(A)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the Board properly interpret and apply § 40-6-9 and

§ 40-6-6 of the Utah Code Annotated in determining that a forced
pooling order was necessary before the Board could order the
requested accounting and make any of the other awards requested
by Bennion.
(B)

Did the Board, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-

1(4)(b) and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
properly dismiss Bennion' s Request for Agency action.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Review of Board Determinations of Facts.

Petitioner (hereinafter "Bennion") is not entitled to relief
from the Court unless he has been substantially prejudiced by an
agency action "based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the

-1g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

court."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989) "Substantial

evidence" is such "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. "

Grace Drilling

Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
776 P. 2d 63. 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
nor a complete evidentiary review.

I&.

This is not de novo review
The Court must review

the Board' s decision by examining both the supporting evidence
and that which fairly detracts from those findings.

Bennion, in

challenging the Board' s findings of fact, must marshall all
evidence supporting the agency' s decision and demonstrate that
despite these supporting facts, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence in light of the conflicting and
contradicting evidence.

First National Bank of Boston v. County

Board of Equalization of Salt Lake county, 799 P. 2d 1163 (Ut.
1990)
2.

Review of Agency Determinations of Legal Issues.

Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an erroneous
interpretation of the law.
(1989)

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

The determination of applicable law is subject to the

"correction of error" standard.

Olympus Oil Inc. v. Harrison.

778 P. 2d 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

-2g \wpn\110\00000z0f W51

3.

Review of Board1 s Application of Law to Fact.

Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an unreasonable or
irrational application of law.
(1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

Review of the Board's application of law to facts and

mixed questions of law and fact is governed by the
"reasonableness and rationality" standard requiring that the
Board's decision not exceed "the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."

Pearl-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of this

Industrial Commission of Utah. 775 P. 2d 439 (Utah Ct. App, 1989);

Johnson yt Pepartment of Employment ?ecmritv, 782 p. 2d 965 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

IV. DETERMINATIVE LAW
The case involves interpretations of provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 40-6-6 and § 40-6-9, both of which are reprinted in the
Addendum to this Brief.

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves judicial construction of the accounting

provisions of Utah' s forced pooling statute found within the Utah
Oil and Gas Conservation Act.

Bennion is appealing from an Order

of the Board dated June 24, 1991 (Addendum "A").
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The Board's

Order was entered in response to a Motion to Dismiss or in the
alternative a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Graham on
September 10, 1990.

(Addendum "B").

Bennion had previously

filed a Request for Agency Action seeking, among other things, an
order for an accounting for two oil and gas wells both of which
are operated by Graham.
Graham asserted in its Motion that it was impossible to
provide Bennion with an accounting or proceeds based thereon
until a Forced Pooling Order has been entered.

Such an Order

would serve to determine what Mr. Bennion' s mineral interests
were in the subject wells and lands and the nonconsent penalty to
be charged against that interest.

The Board, after receiving

arguments and memorandum concerning Graham' s Motion granted
Graham' s Motion and dismissed Mr. Bennion' s Petition for Agency
Action.
B.

COURSE OP PROCEEDINGS BELOW
There is little or no dispute as to the procedural history

of this case and the course of proceedings for this case are set
forth in subsection A above and subsection C below.
C.

STATEMENT OP RELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest in the north

half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M. , in
Duchesne County, Utah.

(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 116).

Bennion owns no mineral interest in the south half of Section 20,

-4g. \wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M. , Duchesne County, Utah.
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 116).

By Order of the Board

dated September 20, 1972, in Cause No. 139-8, a drilling unit was
established for common development of the entire 640 acres
comprising Section 20 as to the stratigraphic interval generally
defined as being from the top of the Lower Green River formation
to the base of the Green River-Wasatch formation (Affidavit of
William J. Dwyer, at 117).

One well was authorized in the

drilling unit comprising Section 20, with the permitted location
in the center of the north half of the said Section 20.
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at U7).
1973,

On or about April 18,

the Texaco-Gulf-Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well was completed in the

north of Section 20 and commenced production.

This well has

produced sporadically since first production.

(Affidavit of

William J. Dwyer, at 1F8).

This well did not produce during the

period 1982 through April 1985.
at 1F8).

(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer,

The Page #2-20C5 Well was drilled as a substitute well

in the NE%SW% of Section 20 and commenced production on or about
February 11, 1981.

(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 119).

That

well has produced continuously since first production.
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at H9).
Graham Energy, Ltd. assumed operations for both the JensenFenzl #1 and Page #2-20C5 Wells in April of 1984.
William J. Dwyer, at 1F10).

(Affidavit of

Effective July 1, 1984, Graham

Energy, Ltd. , acquired the interest of Page Petroleum, Inc. in
-5g:\wpn\il0\00000z0f.W51

the subject lands and wells (Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at
1F10).

By Order dated April 17, 1985, in Cause No. 139-42, the

Board authorized the drilling and production of a second well in
the drilling unit for Section 20.
Dwyer, at 1111).

(Affidavit of William J.

The Order authorized the simultaneous production

of both the Jensen-Fenzl #1 and the Page #2-20C5 wells.
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 1FU).
Neither the Jensen-Fenzl #1 nor the Page #2-20C5 Wells are
drilled on lands believed to be owned by Bennion or in which
Bennion owns an interest.
1112).

(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at

Bennion has refused to lease or otherwise commit his

mineral interest, if any, to the two wells drilled in Section 20.
(Affidavit of William J. Dwyer, at 1113).

Bennion has refused to

pay a prorata share of the costs of drilling the wells.
On July 30, 1985, Bennion filed a petition with the Board in
Cause No. 13 9-47 for an order seeking an accounting and requiring
payment of royalties and production payments affecting the
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well.

The petition was amended on November 18,

1985, to include the Page No. 2-20C5 Well.

During the summer of

1987, while the matter in Cause No. 139-47 was pending, Bennion
brought an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, for accounting complaints arising from the
subject wells and lands.

The action was dismissed in January

1988 for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
-6g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

In June of 1988,

Bennion filed an identical suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah.

On February 22, 1990, the Utah

District Court abstained from jurisdiction, and the complaint was
dismissed without prejudice.

The grounds for abstention were

that the accounting proceeding in Cause No. 139-47 was pending
before the Board.
On May 10, 1990, Graham filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to timely prosecute the accounting matter in Cause No.
139-47.

On May 24, 1990, Graham amended its motion to include

motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and for
failure to join indispensable parties.

By order dated July 31,

1990, the Board dismissed Cause No. 139-47 for Bennion's failure
to timely prosecute.

(R. 37-39).

The Board advised Bennion that

it doubted seriously that it (the Board) had jurisdiction to
entertain another accounting action absent a forced pooling order
first being entered.

(R. 37-38).

On July 17, 1990, Bennion again petitioned the Board for
Agency Action.

(R. 1-6).

Bennion requested, among other things,

an accounting for the subject and subject wells with the Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining.

(R. 3).

The Board pursuant to § 40-6-9(5)

instructed the parties to meet to negotiate and investigate the
issue.

The parties met on August 16, 1990, at the Division of

Oil, Gas and Mining to exchange relevant information and to
attempt to resolve the issues involved in Bennion' s July 17, 1990
Petition.

At the meeting Bennion and Graham through their
-7-
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representatives, attempted to negotiate a voluntary pooling
arrangement.

These negotiations proved unsuccessful.

Between

August 17, and August 31, the parties continued to attempt to
negotiate an acceptable pooling agreement.
At the August 16, 1991 meeting, the parties agreed to
prepare and file pre-hearing issue statements identifying for the
Board those issues that the parties believed were in dispute.
Through the parties' prehearing issue statements, the parties set
forth the central issue before the Board (Addendum "D").

The

central issue was whether a pooling order, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, was a prerequisite for Bennion to receive an
accounting concerning the subject lands and subject wells.
(TR. 27-28, R. 112,

R. 30 and Addendum " D" ).

Both parties stated in

their pre-hearing issue statements that no voluntary or
involuntary pooling order was in effect concerning the wells
(R. 108-115, 28-32. and Addendum "D").
On September 10, 1989, Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities to dismiss Bennion' s request for agency
action or in the alternative for summary judgment.
Addendum " C").

(R. 82-99,

On September 17th, Bennion objected to Graham's

Motion to Dismiss and indicated the necessity of a Board
determination concerning the pooling issue (R. 117-119).

Two days

before the Board hearing, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue,
wherein he claimed that he had a scheduling conflict and further
claimed that he was unclear concerning the issues to be presented
-8g \wpn\110\00000z0f W51

of the hearing, the Board heard Graham7 s Motion wherein Graham
asserted that Bennion was not entitled to an accounting
concerning the wells until a voluntarily or involuntarily pooling
order was in effect for the subject lands and wells.
TR. 37-39),

(R. 185-192;

Bennion objected to the Board hearing the Motion to

Dismiss, and claimed that Graham was using "legal
technicalities".

(TR. 53).

The Board noted that Bennion1 s Motion

for Continuance was unwarranted because Bennion had ample
knowledge of the issue before the Board and the date of the
hearing.

(TR. 13).

The Board further stated that although

Bennion had the opportunity to pursue his equitable share of the
proceeds, Bennion must first obtain a pooling order which would
determine Bennion's percentage mineral interest in the subject
lands and wells and the applicable nonconsent penalties to be
assessed against those interests.

(R. 71-72).

At the hearing, Bennion' s counsel proffered several exhibits
to the Court as evidence.

(TR. 44-45).

The Board found the

exhibits were not relevant to Graham1 s Motion which was the
central issue before the Board.

(TR. 46-47).

Further, the Board

held that the exhibits were not filed in a timely manner pursuant
to regulations promulgated under Utah Administrative Code (1990).
(TR. 46-47).

The Board at a December 6, 1991 hearing allowed the

exhibits to be included in the record, but refused to admit them
as evidence.

(TR. 28-29).

-9g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

VI. SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
The Utah Oil and Gas Board (the "Board") properly dismissed
Bennion' s Request for Agency Action.

The Utah Oil and Gas

Conservation Action governs the relationships between
nonconsenting owners of oil and gas interests and the operators
of wells which are believed to effect those interests.

Bennion' s

request for an accounting and payment of proceeds based thereon
was premature, since he had failed to meet a condition precedent
for such accounting, that is, he had failed to force pool his
interests, thereby identifying his percentage mineral interest in
the subject lands and wells.

Graham maintains that until a

forced pooling order is entered identifying Bennion' s percentage
mineral interest in the subject lands and wells and the
nonconsent penalty to be assessed against said interest is
established, Graham is unable to provide Mr. Bennion with an
accounting or proceeds based thereon.
The Board acted properly in dismissing Bennion' s Petition.
Bennion presented no rebuttal affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other evidence required by Rule 56, and his
pleadings did not rebut Graham' s material facts as they applied
to issues raised in its Motion concerning the necessity of a
forced pooling order.

The Board acted properly in examining the

evidence before it and ruling consistent therewith.

-10g:\wpn\U0\00000z0f.W51

VII.
A.

ARGUMENTS

BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED ACCOUNTING UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS A POOLING ORDER IS ENTERED.
Bennion is not entitled to an accounting pursuant to the

Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act until a forced (involuntary)
pooling order is entered for the subject lands and wells.

Until

such an accounting takes place, it is impossible for Graham to
distribute to Bennion the proceeds which Graham admits he is
entitled to.
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act governs the
relationships between nonconsenting owners of oil and gas
interests, such as Bennion, and the operators of wells believed
to affect those interests.

The statute provides for, inter alia.

the establishment of drilling units to ensure reasoned and
rational production of oil and gas.
6(1) (1988).

See. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-

Participation in the well on the drilling unit and

the attendant right to an accounting results from either
voluntary pooling, or forced-pooling, for common development of
oil and gas interests in the drilling unit.

See. Utah Code Ann.

§ 40-6-6(5) (1988).
Forced-pooling is a statutory procedure that pools all
interests in the drilling unit owned by those, like Bennion, who
refuse to voluntarily pool their interests.
§ 40-6-6(5)(1988).

The rights and duties of the operator vis-a-

-11g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

See. Utah Code Ann.

vis owners of forced-pooled interests, including the right to an
accounting, are defined by this statute,
Bennion has refused to lease or otherwise voluntarily join
in the drilling unit and/or participate in sharing the costs
associated with the drilling and operations of the subject wells.
Therefore, the Utah forced-pooling statute applies to the issues
of this case.

Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and

Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983).
Bennion based his demand for an accounting on the Utah
forced-pooling statute found in section 40-6-6(8) of the Utah
Code Annotated.

The accounting provisions of the forced-pooling

statute are as follows:
The operator of a well under a pooling order in which
there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the
nonconsenting owners with monthly statements of all
costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or
gas produced, and the amount of proceeds realized from
the sale of this production during the preceding month.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8)(1988).

(Emphasis added).

There are conditions precedent to a nonconsenting owner such
as Bennion receiving such an accounting.

Those conditions are a

(1) the formal spacing of the acreage into drilling units and (2)
the forced-pooling of nonconsenting owners into the established
drilling unit.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6(5),-6(8) (1988).

£&£

also Swan & Hallock "The Comparison Contracts, and Effects of
Compulsory Pooling Statutes," 28 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 911,
922-23 (1982).

Until these two conditions are met, no accounting

is possible or required.
-12g:\wpn\110\OOOOOzOf.W51

One of these conditions has been met, the subject lands have
been formally spaced into drilling units.
condition has not been met.

However, the second

Bennion has failed or refused to

voluntarily or force pool his interest into the drilling unit
and, as a result, Graham has no basis upon which to render an
accounting and no basis upon which to pay Bennion any proceeds
due him from production from the subject lands and wells.
As a practical matter, Graham cannot formulate the
arithmetic equation necessary to provide an accounting to Bennion
until Bennion's percentage ownership for the subject lands and
subject wells has been established and a determination made as to
the nonconsent penalty anticipated in § 40-6-6, to be assessed
against Bennion' s percentage ownership interest.

Algebraic

principles confirm that an equation with two unknowns is
unsolvable.

Without a sum certain for Bennion' s ownership

interest and a sum certain for the nonconsent penalty to be
applied against that interest, any accounting of funds offered by
Graham would amount to little more than wild guess-work and
speculation.

Speculation of this type would undoubtedly motivate

Bennion to seek monetary damages for an accounting he would
characterize, at best as faulty, and at worst as fraudulent.
accounting requirement in Utah' s Oil and Gas Conservation Act
should not be interpreted as Bennion suggests or in a way that
would require Graham to subject itself to litigation by
attempting to comply with the impossible.
-13g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

The

A simple remedy was available to Bennion.
even recommended to him by the Board*

This remedy was

Bennion should have forced

pooled his interest in the subject lands and wells.

Forced-

pooling would have established a sum certain as to his ownership
interest and a sum certain as to the nonconsent penalty to be
applied against that interest.

With this information in hand, he

would have been entitled to the accounting he seeks and Graham
would have been in a position to produce both the accounting and
the proceeds due under the forced pooling statute.
Until Bennion establishes his ownership and the forcedpooling order is entered, Graham is not able to, or obligated to,
account to Bennion.

Since there is no forced-pooling order, and,

therefore, no entitlement to an accounting, Bennion' s petition
was properly dismissed.

B.

THE BOARD' S ORDER ON GRAHAM' S MOTION WAS PROPER.
The Board, as an administrative agency, is expressly

authorized to dismiss actions under circumstances identified in
Rule 56B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure § 63-46B-1(4)(b),
Utah Code Ann., (1990).

The only issue before the Board was

Graham' s Motion concerning the necessity of a forced pooling
order as a condition precedent to the accounting demanded by
Bennion.

The only pleadings before the Board and the only

evidence before the Board was that provided by Graham.

-14g:\wpn\110\00000z0f.W51

The Board

properly examined the evidence before it and ruled consistent
with that evidence.
The Board granted Graham' s Motion because there were no
facts in dispute.

Graham' s facts were squarely presented and

were before the Board upon the Affidavit of William J. Dwyer and
through facts maintained in the files of the Division of Oil, Gas
and Mining of which the Board took judicial notice.

The Dwyer

affidavit was attached to Graham' s memorandum in support of its
motions filed in this matter.
Mr. Bennion' s pleadings did not rebut Graham' s material
facts as they applied to the issues raised in Graham' s Motion.
See Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P. 2d 1010

(1963).
Bennion presented no rebuttal affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other evidence required by Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to place facts relevant to the motion
for summary judgment in dispute.

See Rule 56 (e). See also Franklin

Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P. 2d 1040 (Utah 1983).
Bennion' s shrill cry that the Board' s decision was unfair or
prejudicial is unfounded.

Bennion's late filed Motion for

Continuance was rejected by the Board, as was his assertion that
he was "unclear" as to the issue to be addressed at the September
27, 1990 Board hearing.

Bennion understood what was at issue,

and even identified the issue in his Prehearing Issue Statement.
Bennion chose not to respond to the Motion.
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Rather he appeared

and repeated the obvious, that he is entitled to a percentage
share of the proceeds from the subject wells.

This is a

principle that Graham accepts and admits.
Bennion, failed to provide any information or evidence to
either Graham or the Board that would allow either the action to
continue or an accounting to be provided.

As noted above,

without a sum certain as to Bennion' s ownership interest in the
subject lands and wells and the nonconsent penalty that is to be
assessed against his interest no accounting or payment was
possible.

Had he provided this information by way of Affidavit

or through a responsive pleading to refute the Motion, the Board
could have refused to grant the Motion or even ordered the relief
originally requested.

Without this information however, no

relief could have been granted to Mr. Bennion by the Board.
It is instructive to recall that the Board, on June 28,
1990,

when it dismissed Bennion7 s Cause No. 139-47, warned

Bennion that it did not believe that it had jurisdiction to
consider an accounting action absent a forced pooling order.
Bennion ignored this counsel, pressed forward and, without
providing the necessary information, demanded the impossible from
Graham and the Board.

The Board' s decision to grant Graham' s

Motion recognized that Bennion' s request was unreasonable and was
properly consistent with its earlier warning and the unrefuted
evidence presented by Graham.
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C.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS.

This Court recently established standards to be utilized in
the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
administrative agency.

In First National Bank of Boston v.

Country Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P. 2d 1163
(1990), the Court stated that the Administrative Procedures Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires the
. . . appellate court to review the "whole record"
to determine whether the agency's action is "supported
by substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence" is
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. See Console* v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86
S. Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966); Idaho State
Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P. 2d 927, 930-31
(1985); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, lis P. 2d 63, 68 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). An appellate court applying the
"substantial evidence test" must consider both the
evidence that supports the Tax Commission' s factual
findings and the evidence that detracts from the
findings. Nevertheless, the party challenging the
findings—in this case, the taxpayer—must marshal all
of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, the Tax Commission' s
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
In reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court should not
substitute its own conclusions it might have reached had it been
the original trier of fact.

In Grace Drilling v. Board of

Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court said:
In undertaking such a review, this court will not
substitute its judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a
different conclusion had the case come before us for de
novo review. [Citations omitted]. It is the province
of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences
-17g \wpn\110\00000z0f W51

can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
Board to draw the inferences.
D.

THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD' S LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS.

1.
Thg Bpfryfl' S SxpefftlSS ig Neeflgfl to M»H9 tfrg Fipfljpgg in
t;hi§ q??3-

in First National B ^ Q H Q$ Boston Vt Cwnty Bp»r<a
Equalization of Salt Lake County,fijjpy»,the Court recognized
that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be
considered by the appellate court.

The expertise, however, must

be applied in a manner consistent with the agency' s legislative
mandate.
Although it is a "universally recognized rule"
that this court must "take some cognizance of the
expertise of the agency in its particular field and
accordingly to give some deference to its
determi nation," Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590
P. 2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's decision must
rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a creation
of fiat.
Hyrley vT Bpfrrfl Q$ Review pf Inflystyifll Cpmm' r>, 767 P. 2d 524,
526-27 (Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light, 590 P. 2d at 335; 799 P. 2d
1163, 1166 [footnotes included].
The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board under the
forced pooling statute to establish drilling units and order an
accounting when appropriate.

In reaching its findings, the Board

considered the evidence before it, and heard arguments of counsel
from both parties.

Based upon these factors, the Board dismissed

Bennion' s request for an accounting because no accounting was
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possible before a forced pooling order was entered.

Its decision

had a "sound evidentiary basis" and a proper and reasoned
approach to the statutory scheme designed by the Legislature.
Further in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission. 658 P. 2d 601 (Utah 1983), this court said:
In reviewing decisions such as these, a court
should afford great deference to the technical
expertise or more extensive experience of the
responsible agency.
The members of the Board represent a broad range of
interests and backgrounds.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) provides:

2.
The board shall then consist of seven members
appointed by the governor, which the advice and consent
of the Senate. No more than four members shall be from
the same political party. The members shall have the
following qualifications:
(a)
matters;

two members knowledgeable in mining

(b) two members knowledgeable in oil
and gas matters;
(c) one member knowledgeable in
ecological and environmental matters;
(d) one member who is a private land
owner, owns a mineral or royalty interest and
is knowledgeable in those interests; and
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in
geological matters.
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the Board the
necessary breadth of experience to review natural resource
matters.

Because of the experience of the Board and its

understanding of the complexities of pooling orders and
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accounting disputes, this Court should defer to the Board1 s
findings and interpretation of the statute.
2.
The Bpfrrfl' ? L^g»l qonglytgiQn w^g Supports fry the
Record as a Whole.
In the case of Vt^h Department pf AflmjnigtyfrUve ggyyiggg vt
Puftli? geyyig? Commission, SVP^a, the Court explained that
factual questions sometimes lead to determinations of "special
law", which, by their very nature, require the expertise of the
agency empowered by the legislature to make such decisions.

The

Court in reviewing such findings of special laws, held that
considerable weight should be given to such findings.

That

holding reads, as follows:
Also among these intermediate issues are the
Commission' s decisions on what can be called questions
of "special law." These are the Commission's
interpretations of the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially
those generalized terms that bespeak a legislative
intent to delegate their interpretation to the
responsible agency. In reviewing agency decisions of
this type, we apply what we have called the "time
honored rule of law . . . that the construction of
statutes by governmental agencies charged with their
administration should be given considerable weight . .
658 P. 2d 601, at page 610 (citing McPhie v. Industrial
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan v.
Department of Employment Security. 656 P. 2d 411 (Utah 1982).
Because of the extensive record in this matter, there was
sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law contained in the Order of the Board, and the
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Court should give "considerable weight" to the Board's
interpretation of the Forced Pooling Statute.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Court should uphold the Board' s decision dismissing
Bennion' s Request for Agency Action.

This Court' s should affirm

the Board' s decision that in this case a forced pooling order is
a condition precedent to Bennion' s request for accounting and his
underlying request for proceeds from the subject lands and wells.
DATED this

S ^

day of August, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
BY.
Attorneys for Graham Resources, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 532-3333
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Brief to be hand delivered this

*

day of August, 1991, to the following:
Peter Stirba, Esq.
Stirba & Hathaway
215 South State Street
Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid,
this

<

day of August, 1991, to the following:
Thomas Mitchell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General' s Office
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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ADDENDUM "A"

40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Pooling of interests — Order — Operation.
(1) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order the establishment of
drilling units covering any pool. All such orders shall be made upon terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable. Drilling units shall be of uniform size
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that it must make an
exception due to geologic or geographic or other factors. When necessary the
board may divide any pool into zones and establish drilling units for each
zone, which units may differ in size and shape from those established in any
other zone. The order shall include:
(a) the acreage to be embraced within each drilling unit and the shape
of each drilling unit as determined by the board but the unit shall not be
smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically
drained by one well; and
(b) the direction that no more than one well shall be drilled for production from the common source of supply on any drilling unit, and the
authorized location of the well.
(2) The board may modify the order to provide an exception to the authorized location of the well when the board finds such a modification to be
reasonably necessary.
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall cover all lands
determined by the board to be underlaid by the pool, and the order may be
modified by the board to include additional areas determined to be underlaid
by the pool.
(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by the board, the
drilling of any well into the pool at a location other than authorized by the
order, is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order
fixing drilling units is prohibited. The board may modify the order to decrease
or increase the size of the drilling units or permit additional wells to be drilled
within the established units.
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool their interests for
the development and operation of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the board may enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for
the development and operation. The order shall be made upon terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the drilling of
a
well upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be deemed
for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion of the production
allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling
order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced
from each tract by a well drilled thereon.
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and operation of a well on
the drilling unit by any owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for supervision and
storage facilities, as provided in this subsection.
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to bear his proportionate
share of the costs of the drilling and operation of the well (the nonconsenting
owner), the order shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for the
drilling and operation of the well (consenting owners) for the nonconsenting
owner's share of the costs out of, and only out of, production from the unit
attributable to his tract. The board is authorized to provide that the consenting owners shall own and be entitled to receive all production from the well,

applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations payable out of production,
until the consenting owners have been paid the amount due under the terms
of the pooling order or order relating to the drilling unit. In the event of any
dispute as to such costs, the board shall determine the proper costs. The order
shall provide that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject
to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well applicable to his interest in the unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, hig
proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of such production until
costs are recovered as provided in this subsection; and that each nonconsenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations,
the share of production from the well applicable to his interest in the unit
after the consenting owners have recovered from the nonconsenting owner's
share of production the following:
(a) In respect to every such well 100% of the nonconsenting owner's
share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the wellhead connections
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping
equipment, and piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of
the cost of operation of the well commencing with first production and
continuing until the consenting owners have recovered these costs, it
being intended that the nonconsenting owner's share of these costs and
equipment will be that interest which would have been chargeable to the
nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his share of the costs
of the well from the beginning of the operation; and
(b) An amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150%
nor to exceed 200% of that portion of the costs and expenses of staking the
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the cost of
equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead connections), after
deducting any cash contributions received by the consenting owners. A
reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropriate.
(7) The order shall provide that:
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which tract is
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas,
shall have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paid from the production
attributable to that tract. Any royalty interest or other interest not liable
for the costs of production shall be paid by the nonconsenting owner and
not from the production attributable to the tract until the consenting
owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6).
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which is not
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas,
shall receive as a royalty the average landowners royalty attributable to
each tract within the drilling unit, determined prior to the commencement of drilling and payable from the production allocated to each tract
until the consenting owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6).
(8) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly statements of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas produced,
and the amount of proceeds realized from the sale of this production during
the preceding month. If and when the consenting owners recover from a nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsection (6) of this section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner
shall automatically revert to him; and the nonconsenting owner shall from
that time own the same interest in the well and the production from it, and be
liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the
initial drilling and operation. These costs are payable out of production unless
otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting owner and the operator.
History: C. 1953, 404-6, enacted by L.

40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment — Remedies — Penalties.
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been
made upon deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less.
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be
deducted from the payments.
(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil and gas may file a
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why these proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the division within 60 days.
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, all
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system.
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and require the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate
of 1V2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional.
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following
instances:
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opinion to the party for necessary curative action;

(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claiming entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims
and avoid liability under this chapter;
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at
the end of any month; or
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which
payment may be directed.
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STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
00O00

IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM
RESOURCES, INC. TO PAY ROYALTY
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE
JENSEN-FENZL NO. 1 WELL 1-20C5,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH, AND THE PAGE 2-20C5
WELL, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3
SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE
COUNTY, UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
DOCKET NO. 90-034
CAUSE NO. 139-66

ooOoo
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of Sam H. Bennion
("Bennion"), this cause came before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
Department of Natural Resources, on Thursday, September 27, 1990,
commencing at the hour of 10:35 a.m. in the boardroom of the Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, 355 West North
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the hearing of September 27, 1990, argument of the parties was
heard. The following Board members were present at the hearing:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
John M. Garr
Richard B. Larsen
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams recused himself from this
hearing.

The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Utah.
Appearances for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("Division")
were made by Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director; Ronald J. Firth,
Associate Director, Oil and Gas; John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer;
and Brad Hill, Petroleum Geologist.
Bennion was represented by Peter Stirba, Esq. and Barbara
Zimmerman, Esq.
Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") was represented by Phillip Wm.
Lear, Esq. and Danielle M. Ferron, Esq.
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the testimony
adduced, the exhibits received in evidence, and the pleadings of the
parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters
the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and purpose of the
September 27, 1990, hearing was given to all interested parties as
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board.
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, of the
Request for Agency Action and over all the parties interested therein
and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the Order hereinafter set
forth.
3. Pursuant to Section 40-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, (1988),
Bennion has requested that the Board conduct an investigation and
negotiation and that if unsuccessful, the Board order a hearing to
determine why proceeds have not been paid to Bennion from the
Jensen-Fenzl No. 1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range
5 West and the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range
5 West, Duchesne County, State of Utah ("the Wells").
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4.

Bennion's Request for Agency Action, sought relief as

follows:
a.

That the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining initiate an
investigation of the facts of this matter so that
negotiations can take place as required by § 40-6-9(4)
and (5), Utah Code Ann., (1988);

b.

that should negotiations be unsuccessful, the Board
order a hearing as required by § 40-6-9(6), Utah Code
Ann., (1988);

c.

that the Board order Graham to make an accounting to
Bennion for all oil, gas and natural gas liquids
produced from the wells;

d.

that the Board order Graham to pay Bennion all
royalties and working interests not presently paid to
Bennion for his share of oil, gas and natural gas
liquids in the wells;

e.

that the Board find that Graham's delay of payments
from the wells were knowing and intentional and without
reasonable justification;

f.

that the Board assess a penalty to Graham of
twenty-five percent of the payments owed Bennion and
interest to the rate of 1.5% per month from the date of
delinquency until paid;

g.

that the Board order that Bennion not be required to
pay his share of costs of drilling of the Page 2-20C5
well; and

h.

that the Board grant an award of attorney's fees and
costs and such other relief as the Board found
appropriate.
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5. Graham filed a response to the Request for Agency Action on
August 10, 1990, which asserted the affirmative defenses of the
applicable statute of limitation, equitable doctrine of laches,
equitable doctrine of estoppel, equitable doctrine of waiver, failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to
name an indispensable party. Graham requested relief from the Board
as follows:
a.
Dismissal of Bennion's Request for Agency Action with
prejudice;
b.

in the alternative, that the matter be set for informal
hearing;

c.

that Bennion's request for a penalty, interest and
attorney's fees be dismissed; and

d.

that Graham be awarded reasonable attorney's fees,
costs and such other relief as the Board deems
appropriate.

6. On August 16, 1990, counsel for the Petitioner, Barbara
Zimmerman, and for the Respondent, Phillip Wm. Lear, appeared before
Ronald J. Firth and Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. for investigation and
negotiation. At that time the parties exchanged information relevant
to this matter. Graham's counsel took the position that in the
absence of a voluntary or involuntary pooling order, Graham would not
account to or make payments of proceeds to Bennion. However, the
parties agreed to attempt to negotiate a voluntary pooling
agreement. The parties also agreed to file Pre-hearing Issue
Statements prior to the Board hearing of September 27, 1990, setting
forth those issues of fact and law that might remain in dispute
subsequent to the parties negotiations. The parties were unable to
negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement or otherwise settle their
dispute. The parties did prepare and file Pre-hearing Issue
Statements prior to the September 27 hearing. On September 10, 1989,
Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities to
Dismiss Petitioner's Request for Agency Action or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment.
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7.

On September 25, 1990, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue on

the basis that Bennion had a scheduling conflict with regard to his
company's annual operational meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that
Bennion's counsel had received no response from the Board to his
letter of September 17, 1990, concerning what the Board would hear
and argue at the hearing of September 27.

Bennion filed no

memorandum in opposition to Graham's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment.
8.

Both parties stipulate in their Pre-hearing Issue Statements

that no pooling order, either voluntary or involuntary is in effect
concerning the wells.

Both parties also set forth as a central issue

to be resolved at the hearing, the question of whether or not a
pooling order is a pre-requisite to Bennion receiving proceeds from
the wells.
9.

The Board finds that the Motion to Dismiss or in the

alternative for Summary Judgment filed by Graham is properly before
the Board.

The Board also finds that the issue of whether or not a

pooling order, voluntary or involuntary, is a pre-requisite for
receiving an accounting under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), is
properly addressed at this time.
10.

The Board finds no basis for continuing this matter, in that

Bennion has known at all relevant times of the date of the hearing,
and that Bennion's counsel has been afforded adequate time in which
to respond to the issue concerning the necessity of a pooling order
for the relief requested under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988).
11.

The Board finds that the wells are located in a drilling

unit established for common development of the entire lands
comprising Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, USM, Duchesne
County, Utah.
12.

The Board finds that when the drilling unit was established,

Bennion was the owner of mineral interests in the spaced area which

-5-

ownership gives rise to correlative rights.

By virtue of these

correlative rights he is endowed with the opportunity to obtain his
just and equitable share of the oil and gas from the pool which
underlies the spaced area.

The Board finds, based upon the

undisputed evidence, that Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest
in the north half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West,
USM., Duchesne County, Utah.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Pursuant to § 40-6-9(4), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is

entitled to file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to
conduct a hearing to determine why proceeds to which he alleges he is
entitled have not been paid.
2.

Pursuant to § 40-6-9(5), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is

entitled to have the Division conduct an investigation and
negotiation as to why proceeds from the wells have not been paid.
3.

Where the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation, Bennion

is entitled, pursuant to § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988),
to have the Board set a hearing to determine if the delay in payment
of proceeds is without reasonable justification.
4.

The Board concludes that Graham is not required to furnish

nonconsenting interest owners with monthly statements of costs
incurred, evidence of the quantity of oil or gas produced or the
amount of proceeds in the absence of voluntary or involuntary
pooling.

The Board finds a pooling agreement or order to be a

condition precedent to Graham's obligation to provide such an
accounting or payment of proceeds.
5.

The Board concludes that Bennion is not legally entitled,

within the meaning at § 40-6-9(1) or (4), Utah Code Ann., (1989), to
payment of proceeds, inasmuch as there is no pooling in effect.
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6.

The Board concludes that it cannot determine the amount of

proceeds which may be payable to Bennion, even where the extent of
his mineral interest is known, until and as part of a pooling order,
the amounts set forth in § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann., (1988), are
determined.
7.

The Board concludes that the delay in payment of proceeds to

Bennion is with reasonable justification.

Therefore, the Board

concludes that it may not order a complete accounting or order
penalties as provided under § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988).
8.

In order to obtain the relief Petitioner seeks, he must

exercise his statutory remedies by petitioning the Board for a forced
pooling order under § 40-6-6, Utah Code Ann., (1988), or enter into a
voluntary pooling agreement.
9.

The Board concludes that Bennion has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted as to the prayers set forth in
the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 4.c. thru 4.h.

Rule 12(B)(6) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where, on a Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded
by the forum, the motion is to be treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P.
10.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act expressly authorizes

the Board, as an administrative agency, to dismiss actions under the
circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, § 63-46B-l(4)(b), Utah Code Ann., (1990).
11.

The Board concludes that Graham's Motion for Summary

Judgment should be granted, dismissing with prejudice Bennion*s
requests for relief set forth in the Findings of Fact at paragraphs,
4.c. thru 4.h.
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12. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will prevent
the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and protect
correlative rights.
Substantial evidence now being available and considered by the
Board upon which to reach its decision, the Board issues the
following:
QEDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Petitioner's Request for Agency Action as referenced in the
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.a. and 4.b is granted.
2. The Board denies the Petitioner's Request for Agency Action
as referenced in Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.c. thru 4.h. These
requests are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Respondent Graham's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
3.

Petitioner Bennion's Motion for Continuance is denied.

4. The Board retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction over all
matters covered by this Order and over all the parties affected
thereby, and particularly reserves exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate and as authorized
by statute and regulation.
DATED t h i s

rfw

of Oe

tf\UMS-t

199X1

STATE OF UTAH
DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

vSfcr
James W. Carter
Acting Chairman

APPSNPVM "C"

ADDENDUM MC

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF SAM H.
]
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING]i
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO
]i
PAY ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION
]i
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL ]i
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20, ]
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH,
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL,
i
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, ]i
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE
COUNTY, UTAH.

MOTION TO DISMISS
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Docket No. 90-034
Cause No. 139-66

Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham"), by and through its attorney
of record, herewith moves the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to
dismiss this matter for failure to state a cause of action for
which relief can be granted and for failure to name indispensable
parties; or, in the alternative, moves the Board for summary
judgment.

These motions are made pursuant to R619-100-500 of the

Rules and Procedure Before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Utah
Admin. Code (1990), and pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to the motion to dismiss, and
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to the motion for

Respondent seeks dismissal/summary judgment with prejudice and
on the merits.
DATED this 10th day of September, 1990.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By (^^iul^

fat,

Q^L^y

PhXllip
.Hip (torn. Lear''
Danielle M. Ferron
Attorneys for Respondent
Graham Resources, Inc.
50 South Main Street, P. 0. Box 45340
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Address of Respondent:
Graham Resources, Inc.
109 Northpark Boulevard
P. 0. Box 3134
Covington, Louisiana 70434-3134
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
10th day of September, 1990, to the following:
Peter Stirba, Esq.
Barbara Zimmerman, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 1200
Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

M. Denise Wathen
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ADDENDUM " D"

ADDENDUM "D"

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM
RESOURCES, INC., TO PAY ROYALTY
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE
JENSEN-FENZL #1 WELL, 1-20C5,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, AND THE PAGE
2-20C5 WELL, SECTION 20,
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST,
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH.

PRE-HEARING ISSUE
STATEMENT

Cause No. 139-66
Docket No. 90-034

This matter having come before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on August 16,
1990, at an investigation and negotiation conference held before two members of the
Board, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 40-6-9(5) (1989); Barbara Zimmerman having
appeared as counsel for Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, and Phil Lear having appeared as
counsel for Respondent, Graham Resources, Inc., the following issues have been reserved
for hearing before the Board:
1.

General Nature of the Claims of the Petitioner
(a)

Petitioner's Claims: Petitioner is a nonconsenting interest owner of

oil and gas royalties in the following wells in Duchesne County, State of Utah: JensenFenzl #1 Well, and the Page 2-20C5 Well.
(b)

Graham Resources, Inc. is the operator of the aforementioned wells.

(c)

That Graham Resources, Inc. has suspended payment to Mr. Bennion

of royalty payments or production payments regarding the aforementioned wells.

2.

Uncontroverted Facts
(a)

On or about July 17, 1990, Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, filed his

Petition with the Board seeking payment of royalty and production proceeds from two
oil and gas wells operated by Graham.
(b)

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 40-6-9(5) (1989), the Petition

was set for investigation and negotiation by the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining on
August 16, 1990.
(c)

During the negotiation and investigation conference, counsel for

Petitioner inquired of the Respondent's counsel why Mr. Bennion has not been paid with
regard to his interest in some of the wells that Graham operates.

Counsel for

Respondent indicated that Mr. Bennion was not being paid the royalty interest or
production payments due to the fact that the wells had not been pooled under a
voluntary or involuntary pooling agreement.

In response to this, Petitioner's counsel

suggested that, in order for Mr. Bennion to receive the payments he is entitled to, the
parties attempt to stipulate to a pooling order pooling the unit on which the wells have
been drilled.
(d)

Counsel for the Division, Thomas A. Mitchell, requested of both

parties that negotiations continue and that, if possible, a written stipulation be entered
into establishing the pooling of the units. Counsel for the Board also requested that
counsel for both parties meet on August 31, 1990 to discuss the pooling order and any
other issues to be reserved for the hearing. The Board also asked that both parties
prepare a "pre-trial order" by September 5, 1990, indicating what matters had been
resolved by negotiation and indicating any issues are reserved to be heard by the Board.

2

(e)

Mr. Bennion has made a good faith attempt to negotiate with

Graham by and through his attorneys.

Counsel for Mr. Bennion has prepared and

drafted a Stipulation and Order for the pooling of the units operated by Graham and
has delivered this to Graham's counsel in a timely manner. Counsel for Mr. Bennion
has discussed modifications with Mr. Lear by telephone in lieu of a meeting on August
31 as the Board required. A modified stipulation was hand-delivered to Mr. Lear on
August 31, changing the stipulation to comply with Mr. Lear's suggestions. After no
response to the modified stipulation was received by Mr. Lear, his office was contacted
on September 5 and a message was left with Mr. Lear's secretary to contact us with an
answer as to whether Graham intended to enter into the stipulation.
(f)

Mr. Lear's office left word with Mr. Stirba's office on September 5

stating that Graham would not be signing the stipulation and, therefore, the issues would
not be resolved prior to the September 5th deadline.
(g)
3.

Therefore, all issues in the Petition must be resolved by the Board.

Contested Issues to be Resolved

The contested issues which remain

to be resolved by the Board at hearing in September of 1990 are as follows:
(a)

Mr. Bennion's interest in the wells operated by Graham Resources,

(b)

What is owing to Mr. Bennion from Graham Resources, Inc. in

Inc.

royalty payments and production payments.
(c)

Whether or not a pooling order is required (either voluntary or

involuntary) in order for Mr. Bennion to receive what is owed him.
(d)

Whether or not Mr. Bennion is required to sign a Division Order

prior to his receipt of payment.
3

(e)

The total costs for drilling and operation of the wells.

(f)

Whether or not a nonconsent penalty should be applied to the unit

operated by Graham Resources, Inc. and if so, what amount of penalty should be
assessed.
(g)

Whether or not Mr. Bennion is entitled to his share of the oil and

(h)

The total amounts of n.g.l.s produced by the wells operated by

gas in kind.

Graham and determination of payment to Mr. Bennion.
4.

Settlement
As a result of the negotiations which have taken place thus far in this

matter, counsel for the Petitioner, Sam H. Bennion, considers the possibility of settlement
poor.
Therefore, Petitioner asks that the above-mentioned issues be resolved by the
Board at hearing on September 27, 1990.
DATED this (^

day of September, 1990.
McKAY, ByRTOIl^&JILURMAN

IRBJ

BARBARA ZI&MERMAN
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Sam H. Bennion
Petitioner's Address:
Sam H. Bennion
1800 North Holmes Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the t o day of September, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PRE-HEARING ISSUE STATEMENT was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Phillip Wm. Lear
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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0»v?Sfi>\' OF
BBPORE THE BOARD OF O I L , GAS AND MININGS & MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF SAM H.
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO PAT
ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20,
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH,
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH.

RESPONDENT'S PRE-HEARING
ISSUES STATEMENT

Docket No. 90-034
Cause No. 139-66

This matter was presented before the Division of Oil, Gas
and Mining ("Division") on August 16, 1990, for investigation and
negotiation pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

S 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990).

Barbara Zimmerman appeared on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Sam H.
Bennion ("Bennion").

Phillip Wm. Lear appeared on behalf of the

respondent, Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham").

The Division was

present through Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director for Oil and
Gas,

and through its counsel, Thomas A. Mitchell.
Subsequent to the conference, the parties attempted to

further

negotiate

and narrow the range

resolution before the Board.

of issues requiring

The parties were unsuccessful.

Due to the lack of success in negotiating a stipulated
settlement, Graham filed its motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment on September 10, 1990, seeking either dismissal with

prejudice on the merits or summary judgment.

The hearing on the

motion is scheduled for September 27, 1990.
This Respondent's Pre-Hearing Issues Statement sets forth
those issues that are reserved for the Board in the event that
Graham's motions for dismissal or summary judgment are denied. The
issues are as follows:
1.

Jurisdiction.

This is an action for an accounting

and payment of proceeds of production from oil and gas wells.
Jurisdiction is properly invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-69 (1988).

The jurisdiction is not disputed by the parties.
2.

General Nature of Bennion's Claims.
a.

Bennion claims to be a nonconsenting owner in

the Jensen-Fenzl # 1 Well and the Page #2-20C5 Well located in
Section 20 of Township 2 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M., in Duchesne
County, Utah.

(Said wells are collectively referred to herein as

the "Wells").
b.

Bennion claims to be entitled to oil and gas

royalties from the Wells.
c.

Bennion claims to own a 0.0035436% mineral

interest in the Wells.
d.

Bennion claims that Graham is the operator of

e.

Bennion

the Wells*
claims that Graham

has

failed to

provide monthly accounting materials to him based upon production
from the Wells.
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f.

Bennion claims that Graham has withheld payment

of proceeds of production from the Wells attributable to him.
g.

Bennion claims that the Page # 2-20C5 Well was

not properly designated as a production well as required by the
version of Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-6(8) in effect when the well was
permitted and drilled.
h.

Bennion claims that he is not obligated to pay

his pro rata share of the costs of drilling the Page # 2-20C5 Well,
because that well was designated as a production well without
hearing to the Board.
3.

Remedies Sought bv Bennion.
a.

Graham make a full accounting of all oil, gas,

and natural gas liquids produced from the Wells.
b.

Graham pay all amounts of royalties and working

interests not presently paid for Bennion's share of oil, gas, and
natural gas liquids from the Wells.
c.

The Board enter findings that Graham's failure

to pay was known and intentional.
d.

The Board assess a penalty to Graham of 25% of

the payments owed to Bennion and interest at the rate of 1.5% per
month from the date of delinquency until paid.
e.

The Board hold that Bennion is not required to

pay his share of the costs of drilling the Page # 2-20C5 Well.
f.

The Board award Bennion attorney's fees and

costs.
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4.

General Nature of Graham's Response.
a.

Graham does not operate the Wells.

b.

Bennion's

mineral

ownership

is

limited

exclusively to lands in the North half of Section 20.
c.

Neither well is drilled on lands in which

Bennion has an interest.
d.

The lands in which Bennion has an interest have

not been voluntarily or involuntarily (forced-pooled) into the
drilling unit established for Section 20 and the Wells.
e.

Forced-pooling is a condition precedent to

Bennion being entitled an accounting and payment of proceeds from
the Wells.
f.

Execution of a division order is a condition

precedent to Bennion receiving proceeds from the Wells.
g.

Graham's

affiliates

or

subsidiaries

have

operated the Wells only since April 1984.
h.

Graham or its affiliates or subsidiaries have

provided Bennion's counsel with accounting materials on three
occasions since 1986.
i.

Graham or its affiliates have been responsible

for distributing proceeds of gas production only since that April
1984.
j.

Third parties not named in this action are, and

for years have been, responsible for distribution of proceeds from
oil.

-4gi\wpn\050\00000dk4.W51

k.

Bennion

has

failed

to

name

indispensable

1.

Bennion has failed to state a claim upon which

parties.

relief can be granted*
m.

This action is time-barred either in whole or

in part by the statute of limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. S
40-6-9 (1988).
n.

This

action

is

barred

by

the

equitable

doctrines of waiver or estoppel.
5.

Remedies Sought bv Graham.
a.

Dismissal of this matter with prejudice and on

the merits for failure to state a cause of action for which relief
can be granted.
b.

Dismissal of this matter with prejudice and on

the merits for failure to name indispensable parties.
c.

Dismissal of this matter with prejudice because

this action is time-barred in whole or in part by applicable
statute of limitation.
d.

Dismissal of this matter because this action is

barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel.
e.

Entry of an order for summary

judgment on

grounds that the statutory prerequisites for an accounting and
payment of proceeds of production have not been met.
f.

Award to Graham attorney's fees, costs, and any

other relief deemed appropriate by the Board.
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6.
version

of

Dncontroverted Facts, Respondent accepts Bennion's
the uncontroverted

supplements those

facts

a.

as

facts as

stated, but

further

follows:

At the August 16, 1990, investigation and

negotiation conference, counsel for the Division requested that the
parties

attempt

uncontroverted

to resolve
and

their differences

controverted

facts

and

beyond

the

identified
tentative

agreements made at that conference.
b.

By letter dated August 17, 1990, Graham's

counsel submitted a list of possible points of agreement and
stipulation to Bennion's counsel.

Graham's counsel requested of

Bennion's counsel to identify those areas of possible stipulation
and those points that necessarily would need to be reserved for the
Board.

The August 17, 1990 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit

"A."
c.
Bennion's

version

Bennion's counsel responded as set forth in
of

the

Pre-Hearing

Issues

Statement, but

Bennion's response was unacceptable to Graham.
d.

No

accommodation

could

be

reached.

Consequently, all issues are reserved to the Board.
e.

The Board entered its Order in Cause No. 139-4X

authorizing two wells for production from the drilling units in the
Altamont-Bluebell Field of which these lands a part.
7.

Contested Issues of Fact.
a.

Quantum of interest owned by Bennion in the

drilling unit, expressed in a percentage of the total mineral

-6g:\wpn\050\OOOOOdU.W51

estate owned in the tract of land in which he has an undivided
interest and then as a percentage of the drilling unit comprising
Section 20.
b.

Bennion's interest has not been pooled into the

drilling unit and Wells either voluntarily or involuntarily.
c.

Total

cost of drilling

and

reworking

the

Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well.
d.

Total cost of operating the Jensen-Fenzl #1

e.

Sufficient evidence justified the drilling of

Well.

the Page # 2-20C5 Well as a test well.
f.

The total cost of drilling the Page #2-20C5

g.

The total cost of operating the Page #2-20C5

h.

Quantum of forced pooling penalty for the

Well.

Well.

Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well.
i.

Quantum of Forced pooling penalty for the Page

j.

Amounts heretofore paid to Bennion to date for

#2-20C5 Well.

the Jensen-Fenzl # 1 Well.
k.

Amounts heretofore paid to Bennion to date for

the Page # 2-20C5 Well.
1.

Nature

of

future payments

to be paid to

Bennion, if any, whether to be made in proceeds of production or
in-kind.
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8.

Contested Issues of Law,
a.

Whether the entry of a forced-pooling order is

a condition precedent to an accounting and payment of proceeds of
production to "nonconsenting owner,"
b.

Whether the execution of a division order is a

condition precedent to the payment of proceeds of production.
c.

Whether the Page # 2-20C5 Well was properly

authorized and drilled.
d.

Whether the Board's Order in Cause No, 139-42,

legitimized test wells theretofore drilled in the Greater AltamontBluebell Field.
e.

Whether Bennion's interest is properly forced

pooled into the Page #2-20C5 Well.
f.

Whether Bennion is entitled to receive future

payment, if any, in kind,
g.

Whether Graham is entitled to attorney's fees

and costs in this matter.
DATED this 15th day of September, 1990.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Bv £^%^

C^(^W

Phillip m. Lear/
Danielle M. Ferron
Attorneys for the Respondent
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing Respondent's Pre-Hearing Issues Statement
to be mailed by First Class Postage, United States Mail, this 15th
day of September, 1990, to the following:
Peter Stirba, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 1200
Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Barbara Zimmerman, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 1200
Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Thomas A.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Mitchell, Esq.
Attorney General
Capitol
City, Utah 84102

-9-

E X H I B I T
LAW

"A"

OFFICES OF

V A N COTT, BAGLCY, C O R N W A L L & M C C A R T H Y
kfO«A«0
OAV'O C

J WCWtf
tAki«0W«V

C»*M •
>Ot.MC«
• O H A b O O « e " rt
c«»c e OkftOM
CAWOim *OMT«0«C»V
• A f * C I J. 0 1 * * * *

•• t e o r r «oooCAMo
" • 0 » » A » ft
3AV e w
••C»A*0 «
frc*«CM O
•OSC*T 0
0«COO*r •

wOHMtO*
ttik..t**c
»AOC»
%m K O W C
a f M < u
w k w AMI

• o u r «. U M I
•Arrwtw » mmy»nt, •
•
*OMir
JOM e
OUT • « •

••CM? j
a *uouc
C •COTT
ftAvAGC
C»«l« WA«0»OA»0
JO««H

t

MCMMC^M
•AMO k
jQmm A
OAViQ * MAXU * «
MTHUt
AUk*

JOMH

«I«AWAM

«Ai.A«

L SWkh VAN

• o i c r A •crcwtOM

rNOMAS

r

n u

« • •

M WlCHACk HCkkEM
•mtmr
o
c»"i«Tt"»C»
C ZAOCTM A • W t T t C T T
j C r n K * C MCwSOM
»AT».eiA •
tElT*
OAVtO J
JOAOAW
•
» * € • * • » • MA«*MA4.k
»AUW «• OU«**A«
"•0«*l 0
tC»OOMN
M'CMACL J

50
SALT

SOUTM
LAKC

CO*»0»AT,ON

•*« «»o

6 0 0

MA N $ T * C C T

CITY

UTAH

tmon

84144

532*3333

M i n e "
•>*••••»«
-0«r»»
»w'»C»U»*0 4 « A « C3**
• • • «OI
«w'»C*hA«0

T

CCCO»

AOO»CSS

C i <«0>)

S3«OOSt

A L W C O » » C S » O N O C N C C TO

•OST

•»"•

- A * C3**
•Oi * 0 *

COT-

A „ . tON

•O*

A Aw. S O *

4 • »c»

• >

¥AM C O T " a i r e * 4 ' * A t a f t « * 0 * ' • T 0*7

O " CC I O X 4 1 3 4 0
84 4 8

«*

TC» S Ol»CCT

QlAL

OOOCM o r r CC
iw«C » 0 0
A « A « « M O - O N •OwwCvAAO
OSOCM
W'AM AA«0
• O I ! • « S?«J

NUMICK

nAfmtrm n •MCOAM*

• I C H A A O C SHCCN
OANM? C « t t L T
STCVCH 0 « O O O U k N O
t » 0 « A « A. C w u t O M
• l C H A « 0 M WOMMtOM

ONAu

SuiT£

TC.C»«ONC

OAWiO •
OiAC*
J 0 » « » AJIOMWO
MA4V1M 0 AA4CCT

W «&>•*• A « A M «
• M i l k • • * • wCAA

• • O ' C I S

AMOCMOOM

wO*t« r N i c i M N
<•»*«•• 0 M M U i
a*COO*v *
OAAO.C*
WWW'C A MAT t
• C O * * M «AOkCT
T MOTHT « BCAC • • » • • •
WlWk AM •
•tC»A«0»
OOMAlO k. O A t ' O N
OC*AkO •
•WM'VILkC
TM0MA4 C V C U O N
MAftlWTH M H l M K l U N

V TCATCt
COO*
•HOW
••CCMWOOO
A
r m m i i
•

A

M«AH£T

A

•OMACO «
aets
O A V I O w. A M N w a r o *
•UtAA) «
kAW*CMCC
fl

carp •

0 ' eOwatCw
A»*.TOM
OA^X T | * 0 « n O
J O « * N CMHMToae > •
«MV.»lAA1 0 ' O W l t * .
MAAKlM • wCMSCM
0 C 0 « O ( M MCM W . A M

M*aA*vcT

•jkTnirm
OCAH a C M O C u .
OOUOkAS A T A a O A S t
j f l f M * M MO"MA«
«ATMC»IHC

A

roi

JOOi c « O w i C «
oooaos •
THOMAS
••VOW J MMCVCNTO
OAM.CL^C

'C»*OM

3U-»*A«"

w

MONIOM

*

» C » M M

August 17, 1990

Peter Stirba, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

SEP 25 1990
Re:

TMOMAA
••CHAC

Sam H. Bennion
Accounting Proceedings
Docket No. 90-034
Cause No. 139-66

)V

OIV'SIGM OF
M L GAS 4 MINING

Dear Peter:
During the course of yesterday's negotiation conference
initiated by the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, Tom Mitchell
encouraged the parties to stipulate to what issues they could in
an effort to settle this matter short of a protracted Board
hearing. Barbara Zimmerman and I were able to identify several
areas of possible agreement, but neither of us had authority from
our clients to stipulate.
Consequently, I am proposing the following list of
possible areas of stipulation to which I request that you respond
at your earliest convenience:
a.

Quantum of interest owned by Mr. Bennion in the
drilling unit, expressed in a percentage of the
total mineral estate owned in the tract of land in
which he has an undivided interest and then as a
percentage of the drilling unit comprising Section
20.

b.

The total cost of drilling and reworking the
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well.

c.

The total cost of operating the Jensen-Fenzl #1
Well.
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d.

The total cost of drilling the Page #2-20C5 Well,

m.

The total cost of operating the Page #2-20C5 Well.

f.

Stipulation to the act of forced pooling.

g.

Quantum of risk-penalty (nonconsent or forced
pooling penalty) for the Jensen-Fenzl #l Well.

h.

Page #2-20C5 is an authorized well.

i.

Mr. Bennion's interest is properly forced pooled
into the Page #2-20C5 Well.

j.

Quantum of forced pooling penalty for the JensenFenzl #1 Well.

k.

Quantum of Forced pooling penalty for the Page #220C5 Well.

1.

Graham has not waived its right, or is not
estopped from asserting, the legal position that
spacing and forced pooling are conditions
precedent to a nonconsenting owner being entitled
to receive payments and accounting, by virtue of
Graham having tendered accounting information
prior to the date of any forced pooling hearing.

m.

Prior to receiving further payments; Mr. Bennion
will sign a division order containing among other
standard language, acceptable warranty language,
or in lieu thereof will sign a division order from
which warranty language is deleted if he provides
to Graham Energy, Ltd. a title opinion prepared by
a recognized Utah title attorney acceptable to
Graham, confirming his ownership in the drilling
unit from the date of first production from the
Jensen-Fenzl #1 Well to current date.

The foregoing are proposed areas of stipulation only.
I am submitting this list simultaneously to Graham for its
consideration. I have no authority to bind Graham to the
foregoing or to represent that the foregoing comprises the entire
list of possible areas of agreement. This list should be is for
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purposes of commencing discussions in the hopes of settling this
matter.
Please identify those elements to which Mr. Bennion
will stipulate and those which must be reserved for Board
determination. To the extent that you have other suggested areas
of stipulation, please include them in your response.
Time is of the essence. We have until August 31, 1990,
to come to agreement and to prepare for the Board's review a
pretrial order. I look forward to hearing from you.

Very truly yours,

Phillip Wm. Lear
cc:

Raymond Roush, Esq.
William Aspinwall
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